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“DIFFUSION VS. EVOLUTION”: 
AN ANTI-EVOLUTIONIST FALLACY 
By LESLIE A. WHITE 
T has been a contention of the Boas school of ethnology for many years I that theories of cultural evolution are rendered invalid by  the  facts of dif- 
fusion. Thus  Professor Robert H. Lowie says:’ 
One fact, however, encountered a t  every stage and in every phase of society, by 
itself lays the axe to the root of any theory of historical laws-the extensive occurrence of 
diffusion. Creating nothing, this factor nevertheless makes all other agencies taper al- 
most into nothingness beside it in its effect on the total growth of human civilization. 
(Emphasis ours.) 
I n  another place he observes? 
The extraordinary extent to which such diffusion has taken place proves that the 
actual development of a given culture does not conform to innate laws necessarily lead- 
ing to definite results, such hypothetical laws being overridden by contact with foreign 
peoples. 
Finally, Lowie states categorically tha t  “diffusion plays havoc with any  
universal law of ~ e q u e n c e . ” ~  
I n  his numerous critiques of evolutionism, Alexander Goldenweiser fre- 
quently resorts t o  the supposed antithesis between diffusion and  evolution. 
Thus z4 
The theory of diffusion itself, when further elaborated, became a powerful foe of the 
simplicist evolutionary scheme, . . the acceptance of the phenomena of diffusion a t  
their face value is in itself sufficient to negate the evolutionary scheme in its original 
form. 
And, 
A further argument against the stage theory in social evolution can be derived from 
the theory of diffusion. . . , It has been shown that every tribe develops its culture not 
merely out of its inner resources, but a t  least in part under the stimulation of extrane- 
ous cultural items coming from neighboring tribes. As such items in their origins are 
1 Lowie, 1920a, p. 434. (See bibliography at end of article.) 
‘Lowie, 1917a, p. 95. *Lowie, 1937, p. 60. 
Goldenweiser, 1925a, p. 226. 
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obviously independent of the recipient culture, it  follows that to admit them is to 
throw a monkey-wrench into the evolutionary scheme of necessary stages.6 
I n  another  place Goldenweiser cites as a “vi ta l  defect of t h e  evolut ionary 
approach” t h e  fai lure  of evolutionists “ t o  appraise  a t  their  t rue  wor th  t h e  
processes of cul tural  diffusion . . . to  disregard it cannot  b u t  proz1efutnL to any  
theory of historic (Emphas is  ours.) 
In o ther  critiques, also, Goldenweiser showed how “ the  theory of diffusion 
could be  used as a weapon in . the fight against  uncritical evolutionism,”7 b u t  
these a r e  sufficient for  our  purpose. 
Dr. Bernard J. Stern,  in  his biography of Lewis 11. Morgan,  h a s  th i s  to  
say  a b o u t  evolution and diffusion:8 
This exposes a t  once the itihereiat weakness of arty eoulutioticLry clmsijiculion ojctrllzrrr ; 
all sequences are disturbed by borrowing of cultural traits from neighboring pcoplei. 
(Emphasis ours.) 
Melville J. Herskovi ts  and Malcolm M. Willey m a k e  t h e  following con- 
t r ibut ion to t h e  discussion:9 
The earlier anthropologists antl sociologists . . . posited parallel dcvclopmtmt in 
every people . . . . Complete systems, with stages of development, culminating in our 
own particular type of civilization, were posited by such early writcrs as hlorgan, 
Spencer, Tylor, and others. Ilowevcr, it ha5 I)een found that the other cultural mcchnn- 
ism, that of difiusion, constitutctl a grave \tumbling-block to this n pviuri  scheme of 
stage development. . . . 
The belief t h a t  evolutionism is negated by diffusion extends beyond t h e  
members  of t h e  Boas school proper .  T h u s  Professor A. I rv ing  IIallowcll, in a11 
interesting survey  of “Anthropology:  Yesterday and has this to 
say : 
One of the most damaging lines of attack on  evolutionary theories was thc (Icmon- 
stration of the importance of dii‘fusion in culture history. Itleas, customs, technologies, 
etc., constantly spread from one people to another . . . coniacts between g r o u p  of 
different cultures have becii one of the chief stimuli to culture growth and change, 
rather than i~ivention, some “law” of social evolution. . . . 
And Professor Ralph Lin ton  s ta tes  tha t”  
The main weakness of their [the evolutionists] approach lay in their ignorance of 
the principles of diffusion. . . . 
T h u s  we find the ear ly  evolutionists charged with “ i g n o r a ~ ~ c c  of t h c  princi- 
ples of diffusion”, with failure “ to  appraise  t h e m  at their  t r u e  worth”,  and SO 
6 Goldemteiser, 1937, 1). 516 
7 Goldenweiser, 1933, 1). 81. 
9 IIerskavits antl Willey, 1923, p. 195. 
10 Hallo\+ell, 1936. 
6 Goldenweiser, 1922, pp. 26-27 
8 Stern, 1931, 1’. 135. 
Linton, 1936b, pi). 382-383. 
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on. Goldenweiser goes even farther and accuses the evolutionists of having 
contempt for diffusion. After showing how “the diffusion of cultural features” 
marred “the harmony of his [the evolutionist’s] beautifully balanced schemes”, 
Goldenweiser remarks: “The evolutionist’s weapon against the phenomena of 
historical contact was contempt.”12 And in another article he speaks of “the 
evolutionist’s contempt for the processes of cultural borrowing.”ld 
This is a singular accusation. We can understand how even mature and 
competent students could a t  times ignore certain facts or fail to appraise them 
a t  their full worth. But it is difficult to picture them regarding facts with con- 
tempt. I t  is hard to imagine a geologist with a contempt for erosion, or an 
astronomer with contempt for comets. But it is as easy to do this as to imagine 
Tylor viewing the travels of patolli, or Morgan the spread of white man’s 
culture among Indian tribes, with contempt. Yet Goldenweiser states cate- 
gorically that the evolutionist’s weapon against diffusion was contempt. We 
fail to find justification for this judgment in the writings of the evolutionists, 
and Goldenweiser does not enlighten us further on this point. 
As a matter of fact, the evolutionists of the Classical school were not un- 
aware of the extent and significance of diffusion as a cultural process by any 
means. On the contrary, they were very much alive to its ubiquity and impor- 
tance. We shall limit our citation of evidence to the two major leaders of the 
evolutionist school: Edward Burnett Tylor and Lewis Henry Morgan. 
One of the things that every graduate student in anthropology learns early 
in his course of study is how Tylor, “in a splendid example of historical recon- 
struction”,14 traced the diffusion of the piston bellows from Malaysia to Mada- 
gascar. In two noteworthy essays he argued in favor of a theory of diffusion of 
the Mexican game of patolli from Asia. His Researches ircto the Early IIistory 
of Mankind abounds with examples of his recognition of the diffusionist process 
and appreciation of its significance. In Primitive Culture he emphasizes:16 
. . , it must be borne in mind how powerfully the dlfusion of culture acts in preserving 
the results of progress from the attacks of degeneration. (Emphasis ours.) 
“Civilization”, said Tylor, “is a plant much oftener propagated than tle- 
veloped”.16 
Obviously we find no contempt for diffusion on Tylor’s part. On the con- 
trary, he was, as Lowie has remarked, “very much alive to the influence of 
diffusion.”17 As a matter of fact, again to quote Lowie, Tylor “goes much fur- 
ther [as a diffusionist] than at all events modern American ethnologists are 
inclined to follow.”1s 
12 Goldenweiser, 1921, p. 53. 
13 Goldenweiser, 19256, p. 20. l4 Lonie 1920a, p. 6. 
’6 Tylor, 1929, Vol. I, p. 39. 
17 I,oMie, 19170, p. 26%. Goldenweiser, 1931, p 661, too, notes that Tylor “recognized dillu- 
Is Ibid , Vol. I, p. 53. 
sion” and had discussed it “with insight and acumen.” Lowie, 1917b, p. 265. 
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We turn  now t o  Lewis 11. Morgan.  His work, too, abounds  with references 
to diffusion. W e  select some examples f rom his Systems of Coizsanglritidy mad 
~l f f i i tdy  of the I l i imt i i c  17iirrciiy:‘!) 
I t  is a reasonable supposition that contiguous nations, and especially such as  inter- 
marry antl maintain friendly intercourse, are constantly contributing of their vocables 
to each other’s clialects. (1). 188) 
l h e  [l;innish] terms for collatcral consanguinci may have been borrowed from 
Aryan sources, which is not improl>ablc . . . . (1). 62)  
I t  is questionable whcthcr thc Xlandans originatctl the 1)artial civilization of which 
they were founil possessed. ‘I’herc are strong reasons for believing that they obtained 
both their knowlctlgc of agriculture and of house building from the Minnitarccs. . . . 
From the l\iIantlans and Minnitarees they [the Rrickarecs] untloubtcdly learned the 
arts of cultivation and of houscbuiltling. (1). 198) 
Such of the remaining nations as possess this relat ionshil) [cousin] borrowed it,  with 
the term, from thc Roman source; antl it is probable that the Ccrmans clerived the 
conception from the same quarter . . . . (1). 471) 
Morgan went  beyond a n  “awareness” of diffusion. He elevated it t o  t h e  
level of major  importance as a process of culture change: 
“Wherever  a cont inental  connection existed,” he  declared, “all t h e  t r i h  
m u s t  have  shared in some measure in  each other’s  I)rogress.l’so Also, 
Some of these inventions were borrowvl, not unlikely, from tribes in the Middle 
Status; j o r  il tutis by  l l i i s  proi‘css c-otislaiilly rrpcwfrd that  the inore udoaiaccd tribes liflcd zip 
t i m e  bclo~u ~ / w m ,  as fast as  the latter were able to appreciate antl to appropriate the 
means of progress.ZI (Emphasis ours.) 
Far from seeing in  diffusion a n  obstacle t o  t h e  evolut ionary process, Mor-  
gan  thinks of them a s  working together, h a n d  in h a n d :  
Institutions of governnicnt are a growth from primitive germs of thought. Growth, 
tlevelopment 01id trciiisnzissioir, must explain their existence among civilized natioixZ2 
(Emphasis ours.) 
Cul ture  t ra i t s  originate among some peoples and then  diffuse to o ther  
tribes and nat ions:  
Horticulture antl other domestic arts spread from the Village Indians to the tribes 
in the Lower Status of barbarism, and thus wlvancetl them materially in their onward 
progress toward thc higher contlition of the Village Indians. Numerous tribes were thus 
raised out of savagery into barbarism by appropriating the arts of life of tribes above 
t h ~ r n . 2 ~  
Thus evolution and diffusion work together ;  t h e  one process originates, t h e  
(P. 181) 
other  spreads: 
1s) Morgan, 1871. 
21 I b i d . ,  p. 530. 
23 Morgan, 1881, p. 44. 
*” Morgan, 1878, 1). 40. 
22 Morgan, 1878, 1). 508. 
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In addition to this known [evolutionary] sequence of the means of progreis . . . 
every nation upon a contincnt had one or more contiguous nations between w h o m  ant1 
itself thcre was more or lcss of intercourse. Amongst contiguous nations there would be 
free propagation of arts and inventions. . . . Nations arc apt to share in the more im- 
portant elemcnts of each other’s 
We have now demonstrated that neither Tylor nor Morgan, the ou tstand- 
ing leaders of the Evolutionist school i n  Europe antl America, were “ignorant 
of the principles of diffusion,” that neither one “failed to  appraise the facts of 
diffusion at their true worth”; neither held diffusion in “contempt”. On the 
contrary, they both recognized the tliffusionist process everywhere, and both 
had a fine appreciation of its significance. As  a matter of fact, they regarded it 
as a major process of culture change among peoples. And, far from seeing an 
antithesis between evolution antl diffusion, they saw tha t  these two processes 
work harmoniously together, the one originating culture traits, the other 
spreading them far and wide. 
If prominent evolutionists like Morgan and Tylor recognized diffusion and 
appreciated its importance; if they saw no antithesis between diffusion and 
evolution, but on the contrary regarded them as complementary processes, how 
has it been possible for the Boas school to declare that diffusion negates evo- 
lution? 
The  answer is simple: the Boas school has confused the evolulioiL of Luliure 
with the Lulltire history of peoples.  The evolutionists worked out formulas which 
said tha t  a culture trait or complex B has grown out of trait or complex A, 
and is developing into, or toward, trait or com1)lex C. I n  other words they 
describe a culture process in terms of stages of tlevelopmenl. They say nothing 
about peoples or tribes. They do  not say that a tribe has to go through stages A 
and B before arriving a t  stage C. They know fu l l  well that  a trihe can obtain 
the culture of stage C by diffusion without ever going through stages A and U.  
But  the Boas school has tried t o  apply these formulas that descrille a proc- 
ess of cultural development to the culture history of a people. Naturally the 
attempt failed; the cultural formulas have nothing to  do with peoples. But 
instead of discovering their own mistake, the Boasians have rejected the evo- 
lutionists’ formulas. Le t  us make the issue clear with an  example. 
The evolutionists described the development of writing as follows: first 
there was picture writing; out of this grew a form of rehus writing; antl out of 
this emerged the alphabet form. What they have done is to tlescrihe a cultural 
process; they have said that these three stages follow one another in this order. 
They have said nothing about any tribe or nation, or about the order in which 
it might acquire one or another of these forms of writing. But members of the 
Boas school have applied formulas of this sort to  specific tribes and peoples. 
24 Morgan, 1871, 1). 448. 
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And when they found tha t  a people might go directly from stage A to  C, omit- 
ting stage B, they declared that the formula had  been invalidated. Let u s  cite 
one more illustration. 
One of the favorite arguments against evolutionism advanced by the Boas 
school has to do with iron-working among certain African tribes. They point 
out tha t  these tribes went directly into an  Iron Age from the Stone Age, omit- 
ting the ages of Copper and Bronze. I-Ience, they conclude, the evolutionist’s 
sequence, stone-copper-bronze-iron, is invalid. Thus  Goltlenweiser writes: 
. . . the evolutionist. . . posited the three stages: stone, bronze and iron. But in 
the only other [than Europe] culture area where the use of iron was known, namely, 
that of Negro Africa, the stage of iron followed directly upon that of stone, omitting 
the bronze 
And Lowie says: 
The African Stone Age was riot supcrscclcd by a Copper Age, but directly by a 
period of Tron,2G . . . the Africans did not pass from a Stone Age to a n  Age of Copper antl 
Bronze and then to an Iron Age; . . . they passed directly from the manufacture of 
stone tools to the manufacture of iron tools.27 
This is an  interesting episode in the history of ethnological theory. One 
might get the impression from the Boas school tha t  the evolutionists were not 
aware of these facts of African culture history, or i f  they were acquainted with 
them, tha t  they did not appreciate their significance. B u t  this is not the case; 
both Morgan and  Tylor were familiar with them. Morgan, for example, after 
discussing the way in which “joreign elements intermingled with the native 
culture in sections of the Eastern hemisphere [have] produced an  abnormal 
condition of society, where the a r t s  of civilized life were remolded to the apti- 
tudes and  wants of savages and barbarians,” remarks: 
Iron has been smcltetl from the ore by a number of African tribes, including the 
Hottentots, as far back as our knowledge of them extends. After producing the metal 
by rude processes cirqiLiredfvornfr)rc,igit sources, they have succcctlctl in  fabricating rude 
implements and wcapons.*8 (Emphasis ours.) 
Tylor, speaking in general of the history of metallurgy, says: 
I n  . . . districts, such as Polynesia, Central antl South Africa and America (except 
Mcxico antl Peru), the native tribes were moved directly from the Stone to the Iron 
Age without pass;ng through the Bronze Age at 
. _. ~ 
Goltlen\\eiser, 1922, p. 2.5; also 1937, pp. 513-514. 
27 Lob ic, 1920n, p 437. 26 I , o ~ i e ,  1917n, p. 81. 
ZR hlorgan. 1878, p. 463. On this same point I.o%ie, 1940, p. 371, says “This cxample is easily 
explained hy contact i r i t h  a people of blacksmiths who taught the  stone-using Negroes to forge 
iron tools.” 
a. Tylor, 1910, p. 118 
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Of Africa, specifically, he says: 
Most of Africa, on thc other hand, seems to have had no bronze age, but to have 
passed directly from the stone age to  the iron age.30 
Thus Morgan and Tylor were well acquainted with these facts before 
Goldenweiser and  Lowie were born. 
Granting tha t  certain African tribes went directly from the stone age to 
the iron age, would this in any way invalidate the evolutionist’s sequence3I 
of Stone, Bronze, and Iron? Not  in the least. The  fact tha t  a tribe gets a com- 
plex of traits from a foreign source by diffusion has nothing whatever to do  
with the series of stages in which this culture complex developed. Morgan and 
Tylor saw this clearly; the Boasians have not. 
To return for a moment to the evolutionist’s sequence of picture-writing, 
rebus (or hieroglyphic) writing, and alphabetic writing, does the fact tha t  our 
Pueblo Indians today are proceeding directly from picture-writing to alpha- 
betic writing, omitting the hieroglyphic stage, prove tha t  the evolutionist’s 
sequence is unsound? Manifestly not;  i t  does not even touch it. Furthermore, 
neither Morgan nor Tylor was so naive as to believe tha t  a given tribe had to 
pass through all the preceding stages of cultural development before i t  could 
take over the alphabet, the calendar and the niultiplication table from its 
neighbors. What the evolutionists were doing was describing stages of cultural 
development, not tracing the culture history of tribes. 
In opposing evulutionism with diffusion, Boas writes:32 
We must try to uiiderstand more clearly what the theory of a unilinear cultural 
development implics. I t  means that diJereut grotips of mcirtkind started at  a very early 
time from a general condition of lack of culture . . . and developed everywhere approxi- 
mately along the sanie lines, making similar inventions and developing similar customs 
and beliefs. (Emphasis ours.) 
~ 1 ~ 0 , 3 3  
Thus it docs not seem to be certain that evcry people in an advanced stage of civiliza- 
tion must have passed through all the stages of development. (Emphasis ours.) 
But  what evolutionist ever said tha t  every people had to pass through all the 
stages of development? They have said that culture must pass through certain 
stages of development, bu t  they have not said tha t  “different groups,” “every 
people,” etc., have to go through these stages. As we have already shown, 
Morgan and ‘I‘ylor were well aware tha t  tribes can and  do take “short cuts” 
via diffusion. 
30 Tylor, 1916, p. 280. 
LVe might note a t  this point lhat Tylor once remarked that “it is a question ~ h e t h e r  men 
first \corked copper or iron” ( d i d . ,  p. 278). 
a* Boas, 1938, p. 178. 33 Ibid., p. 182 (1922 edition). 
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This misconception of Boas is shared h y  his  s tudents .  
T h u s  Lowie writes: 
There is another remarkable fact about the Ncgro Iron Age.  Wliilc the Kgyl)tiaiis, 
Chinese and Babyloiiians first used bronze, the Negroes ticvcr pa 
stage but progressed directly from stone to iron. Some of thcin made copp(’r ant1 bronze 
objects, but simultaneously with iron ones. ’This is one of the  clcarc65t instances o f  how 
d i j m n t  Y U C V S  [our emphasis] need not pass through precisdy thc same stages of civiliza- 
tion.:j4 . . . Hcncc the specious plea that a fiiveti people must 1)ass through such or such 
a stage in our [Lowic’s cmphnsis] history bcbforc attaining this or that tlcstin;it ion can 
no longer be sustained.:1b 
Bernhard J. Stern falls in line with:3u 
The  cultural antl social history of a people can be cxplaincrl only in the ligtit ol its 
historical relations and cultural contacts, and not by any general univmal  schcmc of 
evolution. 
To  quote Boas again, “ E a c h  cul tural  g roup  has  i ts  own unique history.” 
This  leads him to disavow “uniform evolution t h e  world over.”37 
To  be sure  each people h a s  its own his tory,  antl this history is unique.  It is 
absolutely t rue,  as S tern  says, t h a t  t h e  cul ture  history of a peol)lc can  i i e  ex- 
plained only in terms of its own cul ture  his tory,  no t  in te rms  of an evolutionist 
formula, But  the point  is t h a t  no cvolutionist--.at least nei ther  Morgan  nor 
Tylor-ever said otherwise. ‘l’hcy knew this as well as t h c  13onsians. As we have  
said before, t h e  evolutionist’s formulas  describe cul tural  processes, s tages  of 
cul tural  development. T h e y  are not  ap1)licable to the  cul ture  his tory of tribes 
and were not  intended for this  purpose.  Lei us  hear  what  ‘I‘ylor an t l  M o r g a n  
have  to say on this subject .  
We begin with a quota t ion  Irom ‘I’ylor in which lie s ta tes  eq’licit ly antl 
specifically that his  concern is with ctil!iire ra ther  t h a n  with t r ibes  or 11‘ 1 t’ 1011s: 
I f  the field of enquiry be narro\vctl from Tlistory as a \vhole t o  that 1)ranch of it 
which is here called Culture, the history, ,to[ of tribes or rruliorrs, but of the condition of 
knowlctlge, religion, ar t ,  custom, antl the like [in short, r iddurc]  among thcm,  t h e  task 
of investigation proves to lie within far more mo(1crate cuml)ass.:’8 (I<ml)h;isis ours.) 
I n  another  place Tylor  says: 
On the whole it appears that wherever there are Found claboratc arts, abstruse 
knowlctlgc, complex institutions, thesc arc results of gradual tlcvclo~)incni. from an 
earlier, simpler, anti ruder state of life. No stage of civilization comes into existence 
spontaneously, but grows or is tlevclopctl out of thc stage before it.39 
Again ’l’ylor : 
;34 Lowic, 1934, 13. 142. 
JB Tylor, 1920, VOI. I ,  1). 5. 
36 I.o\vie, 1020~s, 11. 441. 
3R Stern, 1931, p. 136. 37 lk~:ts, 1020, 1). 31 7 .  
39 Tylor, 1916, 1). 20. 
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The details of Culture are capable of being classilied i n  a great number of ethno- 
graphic groups of arts, belicfs, customs, and the rest; the consideration comes next 
how far the facts arranged in these groups are produced by evolution from one an- 
other.40 
‘I’ylor’s conception is quite clear. H e  is concerned with culture, with the 
way in which one stage “is developed out  of the stage liefore it,” with the 
manner in which one group of culture traits “are produced hy evolution from 
one another.” H e  does not state, nor do his remarks imply or even allow of the 
intimation tha t  “every people must pass through all the stages of develop- 
ment,” as Boas claims. As a matter of fact ,  peoples-tribes or nations-are 
mentioned only to exclude them from the scope of his study. 
Morgan, likewise, is concerned with tracing the course of cultural develop- 
ment from savagery, through barbarism, to  civilization. He  is talking about 
culture, not peoples, when he says:41 
House architecturc . . . can be tracctl from the hut of the savage through communal 
houses of the barbarians, to the house of the single family of civilized nations (p. 0) .  
Subsistence has bern increased antl perfected by a series of successive arts, introduced 
a t  long intervals of time, antl connectetl more or  less directly with invcntions and tlis- 
coveries (p. 5) .  
Morgan states tha t  “the gens has passed through successive stages of de- 
velopment,”v2 arid tha t  “the family can be definitely traced through several 
successive B u t  we know of no place in which he says tha t  each tribe 
must pass through all of these stages if it is to advance culturally. On the con- 
trary, as we have seen from earlier quotations, Morgan believes tha t  elements 
of kinship systems diffuse from one people to another. 
In  the evolution of writing, Morgan distinguishes five stages:“ 
1. Gesture 1,anguage . . . ; 2. Picture Writing . . . ; 3. Hieroglyphs . . . ; 4. Hiero- 
glyphs of phonetic power . . . ;and 5, a Phonetic Alphabet. 
Nowhere, so far as  we know, does Morgan declare, or even imply tha t  each 
tribe, everywhere, must go through the same series of stages of cultural de- 
velopment. On the contrary, he takes pains to  show tha t  
Through influences, derived from the higher races, the iiidigcnous culture of many 
tribes has been arrcstetl, and so far atlultcratctl as to C I U J I I ~ L ’  the natural pow oJ lhcir 
progrcss. Their institutions and social state b c c . t r w  riiodijcd i n  con~equencc.~~ (Emphasis 
ours.) 
H e  points out tha t  the ancient Britons possessed iron, but tha t  they had 
40 Tylor, 1929, Vol. I, p. 14. 
42 Morgan, 18x1, 11. 3 ,  
I4 Ibid., 1). 520. 
41 Morgan, 1878 (IIolt edition). 
blorgan, 187X, 1). 5. 
Ibid.. 1’. 46.3. 
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not developed the metallurgical ar t  themselves but had acquired it from “more 
advanced continental tribes.”46 
Finally, it is made clear by the passages which we have quoted earlicr from 
Morgan’s works, that he considered diffusion so common that inany tribes did 
not have to develop various arts theniselves but could borrow them ready- 
made from their neighbors. It was, as Morgan said, “by this process constantly 
repeated that the more advanced tribes lifted up those below them.’’47 
In attributing to the evolutionists the belief that all peoples must pass 
through the same series of stages of cultural development, the Boas school has 
made them out to be a peculiarly unobserving and stupid group of men. Is it 
conceivable that Morgan, who was intiniately acquainted with scores of 
Iroquoian Indians, could fail to observe that they adopted many traits from 
their white neighbors without going through the stages of evolution that were 
necessary to produce these traits? Did not Morgan see them learning to use 
the alphabet, the calendar and the multiplication table; adopting various tools, 
articles of clothing, elements of architecture; taking over ideas of money, 
social life,and Christianity? Is one to believe that Morgan was so obsessed with 
a formula that he could close his eyes to the facts before him and insist that  the 
Seneca would have to go through a stagc of hieroglyphic writing before they 
could adopt the alphabet; that they would havc to use Roman numerals for a 
time before they could adopt the Arahic notation; that  they would havc to 
develop the calendar, metallurgy, arid monotheism by themselves if they were 
ever to possess them? Even if  Morgan had not supplied us with the evidence 
to prove the contrary, i t  would require considerable testimony and argument 
to convince us that he-or anyone else-could have been as blind, stu1)l)orn 
and stupid as the anti-evolutionists make hiin out to be.4R 
The same argument will hold true for Tylor, and we need not repeat i t .  
To declare that he championed a theory that every people had to  pass through 
the same series of stages of cultural development by themselves, without taking 
advantage of the resources of their neighbors, would be absurd. 
The confusion between evolution of culture and culture history of pcoples 
finds expression among the Boas group in another form: they are often unable 
to distinguish the evolutionist process from the historic process. This clistinc- 
tion can be made clear with a simple example. ‘The description of writing which 
says that picture writing came first, out of this grew hieroglyphic writing, and 
out of this evolved the alphabet, is an example of the evolutionist process. I t  
deals with writing in general, without reference to time or place. I t  deals with 
classes of phenomena, not with single and unique events. The Iiisiory of writing 
46 Ibid., p. 11. I7 Zbid., p. 530. 
Remarks like the following are not uncomnion in tlic anti-evolulionist literatitie of the 
Uoasians: “It may be said categorically that evcn at his worst Rforgan never perpctr;itrtl more 
palpable nonsensr, and that is saying a good deal.” (Loaie, 19200, 1). 389) 
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is quite different. I t  says, for example, that in a certain place a t  a certain time 
a certain form of writing was found. In  the Sinai peninsula, a t  a given time, a 
specific people invented the alphabet. The alphabet spread subsequently to 
this land and to that people a t  definite times where certain changes were made, 
and so on. In history the emphasis is upon the single event, unique in time and 
space.49 
Now the Boas school has tried to make evolutionist formulas do duty as 
history. Thus Boas says:60 
It  would seem that an acceptable general theory of the developinent o j  civilization 
must meet the demand that the historical happeiziiigs in any  particular region conjorm 
to it. (Emphasis ours.) 
According to this reasoning, a general theory of the development of writing 
would have to  conform to the historical happenings among the Seneca tribe 
in western New York between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. But 
the general theory does not “conform”: the Senecas go directly from an incipi- 
ent stage of picture writing to a full-fledged system of alphabetic writing. 
Therefore, the Boasians conclude, the general theory is invalid. Their reasoning 
is singular. I t  is like trying to use the geometric theorems of Euclid to ascertain 
the size and shape of Farmer Hawkins’ hay field, and when you discover that 
the theorems will not give you this specific information (“will not conform to 
the historical happenings in the particular region”) you declare that the 
theorems are invalid. You will go further, if you reason as Boas has done: you 
will assert not only that those particular theorems are invalid, but that  geome- 
try itself is a delusion; for Boas has concluded not only that certain evolutionist 
formulas are wrong but that the evolutionist process itself does not exist. 
Professor Ruth Benedict similarly confuses history with evolution when she 
says 
The historian is not helped in the reconstruction of Plantagcnct England by any 
concept of the evolution of government; just as superfluous for him also, the anthro- 
pologist insists, is any scheme of cultures arranged according to an ascending scale of 
evolution. 
The theorems of Euclid do  not help us in measuring the hay field, there- 
fore .  . . 
Edward Sapir expresses his confusion by calling evolutionism “pseudo- 
history.”62 Evolutionism is not pseudo-history; it is not history a t  all. An ac- 
Kroeber, 1923, discusses both the evolution of writing and the origin and history of the 
alphabet. He begins by stating that “three sloges arc logically distinguishable in the devclopmenl 
of writing,” (p. 263; emphasis ours). After discussing the evolution of writing he sketches the 
history of the alphabct. 
Boas, 1940, p. 340. 
)* Sapir, 1927, p. 101. 
b1 Benedict, 1931, p. 810. 
count of tlie evolution of writing is certainly not the same thing as the history 
of writing. 
Goldenweiser crowns their argument with this penetrating observation? 
ITatl tlie evolutionist, bccn hktorians rathrr t h a n  amatcur anthroi)olofiists, t h e  
classical theory of social cvolut ion \roultl probably  ni)t have I)rogrcsrctl b(ayoiid its 
ear ly  phase\ .  
‘I‘liis is a rcniarknble conclusion to  reach: if tlie eiirly anthropologists liatl 
Ixxn Iiislorians insteal of evolntionistl;, the theory of evolution would not 
have been tlevelopetl very far. \Ye can, of course, only agree with Goltlenweiser. 
If these amateurs liatl 1,ceii historians insteatl of c\olutionists they would, 
naturally, have dune history instead of cvolution. There is little doul)t ;tbout 
that .  By the same loken, il lJeetho\cn had ljeen a coljblcr instead of a comlmer  
he would have niatle Imots instead of symphonies. And if Nywleon had been 
a bookkeeper instead of ;L soltlic,r. . , . 61 Goltlciiweiser, likc Sapir arid other 
members of the Boas group, is incaliahle of recogni~ing the evolutionist process 
in culture, antl of distinguishing the historic 1)rocess from the evolutionist 
process.G6 ‘Yo them, evolution i5  merely history “gone wroiig”----(‘l)seu(lo- 
history,” as Sal’ir calls it. As a matter of fac t ,  such early “imiateurs” as Mor- 
gan and ‘I’ylor were historians cis zvell (1s evolutionists. I3ut they were able to 
distinguish the one 1)roccss from the othcr; they did n o t  t ry  to s q u c e m  history 
out of evolutionist formulas. 
A problem still confronts us: I row has the Ihas  school fallen into such an 
error? Why have they accusutl 1 he cvolut ionists of ignoring diffusion, of failing 
to a111 reciatc its significance, or of regarding it with contempt, when the two 
outstanding nienilms of 1 he ICvolutionist school have tlrmonstratetl an intimate 
acquaiiitance with the diffusion ljrocess and a com1)lete untlerstantling of the  
role it has played in culture history? IVhy have they tleclaretl tha t  evolutioniit 
theory postulated the necessity of each ant1 every tribe progressing through the 
same series of stages of development when men likc Morgm antl ‘I‘ylor not 
only never made such a clailii h u t  sl’ccifically antl explicitly contradicted such 
an assumption? Aiitl finally, why have the Doasians used the facts of diffusion 
to  relute evolutionist theory when it is plain, as  Morgan showed, that  evolution 
ant1 diffusion ;ire cultural ~)rocesschi t h L t t  work hnrinoniously together? \lie shall 
not at tempt to provide corn1)lete and atlerluate answers to these questions here. 
b ’ e  shall (lo 110 more than to try to throw sonic light upon them. 
In thc first place, Boa5 :tnd most of his disciples have always been ardent 
63 C;oldeiiaeiscr, 19\31, p.  661. 
64 Coldcnweisrr, it iiiiiy bc iiotcd i n  passing, has h e n  called  he p1iilosl)ller of ilnierican 
anthropology,” (I.ouic., 1022, p. 235. ) 
Cf. White, 1938 aiitl 1945, for a tliscussion of the historic, evolutionist, and functionalist 
processes in cult Lire its wcll as in biohgical :ind physical phenomena. 
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anti-evolutionists.GG As Paul Radin has put  it, the evolutionary view was chal- 
lenged “notably by Boas . . . a good par t  of his energies and those of his school 
had to be devoted to disproving it.”57 Goltlenweiser has written critique after 
critique of evolutionism. Something like the ardor that glowed so strongly i n  
the breast of tha t  staunch opponent of evolution ant1 science, William Jennings 
Bryan, appears to have animated many members of the Dons school. Uerthol(l 
Laufer was once moved to brand the theory of cultural evolution as “the most 
inane, sterile, and pernicious theory ever conceived in the history of science.”88 
Bryan declared that “no more repulsive doctrine was ever proclaimed by 
ma11”5~ than the doctrine of evolution. With this philosophic outlook, thereforc, 
we would expect the Boils school to be predisposed in favor of any theory 
that opposed evolution. When, therefore, a theory appeared which seemed to 
“lay the axe to the root of any theory of historical laws,” they were sufficiently 
uncritical to accept it and to use it, as Coltlenweiser expresses i t ,  “as a weapon 
in the fight against uncritical [sic] evolutionism,” and this for decades. 
In  the second place, we might ask if Ihas  and his students have read the 
works of the men they criticiLe. This may appear to be an  ungenerous suspicion, 
but it is not the first time it has been raised. Father Wm. Schmidt, for example, 
has flatly accused two members of the Boas school, Edward Sapir and  Paul 
Radin, of criticizing Graebner without having read his works-unless, as he 
says, we wish “to come to even less gratifying conclusions.”6o Tha t  our ques- 
tion is a fair one is indicated by the fact that  a memher of this group, Bernhartl 
J. Stern, in his biography of one of the outstanding evolutionists, has declared 
that “Morgan nowhere in his books uses the word whereas this 
word appears on the very Jirsf page of Chaptcr I of the Kerr edition of iltzcient 
Socie/y, and twice i n  the first four pages of the Holt edition. I t  is found also 
in other books and articles by Morgan.G2 I t  is clificult to see how one who hat1 
read Morgan could have made such a claim. Franr, Boas fails even to  mention 
Morgan’s name in his essay, “The History of Anthropology,”BY although he 
remarks that his “sketch of the history of the prevailing tendencies in anthro- 
pology would be incomplete without a few remarks on the men who have niatle 
it what it is” (p. 522). Paul Iiadin has asserted that “to all Boas’ disciples 
Morgan has since remained anathema antl unread.”fi4 This is undoubtedly an  
exaggeration, for it is obvious that Lowie has read Morgan. Still it is difficult 
to see how Lowic could have read the passages in Morgan tha t  have been 
68 Why Boas and his disciples have bcen anti evolutionists IS a question too big to be ansv ercd 
here I t  is an interesting and important question, hov ever, and one that we shall h o p  to consider 
at  a later date 
67 Radin, 1933, 1’ 4. 
6o Schmidt, 1939, pp 39, 5 5 ;  see, also, p. 43, fo i  the same charge leveled against an :\merican 
81 Stern, 1931, p 23 
83 Boas, 1904. 
64 Imifer, 1918, p. 90 B9 Ijryan and Etynn, 192.5, 11. 547. 
:tnthropologist \tho \ \as not a pupil of Iloas. 
G2 Cf. White, 1944, pi) 224-225. 
n4 Radin, 1939,~ .  303 
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quoted in this essay and have come to  the conclusion tha t  diffusion negates 
evolution. 
Thirdly, and finally, we believe that the Boas school has been led into the 
confusion of the evolution of culture with the history of peoples by  the  un- 
critical use of such expressions as “a culture,” or ‘(a given culture.” 
We have seen how the Boasians have declared that evolutionist theory re- 
quired “each people,” “different races,” etc., to pass through the same series 
of stages of cultural development. This  confusion of peoples with czrltiire is 
obvious enough, and would no doubt have been apparent t o  the Boas group 
had they not been eager to destroy so objectionable a doctrine as tha t  of evolu- 
tion. But  they occasionally present their argument in other words, saying 
tha t  evolutionist theory requirccl “a given culture” to pass through a certain 
series of stages of development. The argument now takes on subtleties, for 
what is “a given culture?” Is this a cultural category or an e fhn ic  category? 
Is  its referent culture or people? We shall see tha t  it is ambiguous; it means 
now one thing, now another. It makes it easy to slide from a s tudy  of rlevelop- 
mental processes irt czdlure to a consideration of the cultural experiences of 
a people without being aware tha t  you have changed premises in mid-syllogism. 
Let  us illustrate with an  example: 
the extraordinary extent to which such diffusion has taken place proves that the actual 
development of ( I  giwn czrZtzirP does not conform to innate laws necessarily leading to 
definite results, such hypothetical laws being overridden by contact with foreign 
peoples.GG (Emphasis ours.) 
Lowie states tha t  
Ralph Linton speaks of 
A belief in the unilincar evolution of all institutions and cultures, that is, that all 
cultures had passctl or were passing through exactly the same stages in their upward 
climb.00 (Emphasis ours.) 
What is a culture? The  ordinary answer would be, A culture is the culture 
belonging to a tribe or t o  a region, such as Seneca culture or Plains culture. 
Seneca culture would therefore be tha t  portion of the culture of the human 
species tha t  is possessed by a tribe called Seneca; Plains culture would be that 
portion of human culture tha t  is found in a certain geographic region. A trait 
is not an  element of Seneca culture unless it is (or was) possessed by the Seneca 
tribe; similarly, a trait is not a n  element of Plains culture unless it is found 
in the Plains area (or came from tha t  region). We see, then, t ha t  in each case 
the determining factor is something tha t  lies outside culture itself. If il trait 
from another tribe should diffuse to western New York and become accepted 
by the Seneca tribe i t  becomes an  element of Seneca culture; likewise, i f  a 
.m Lowie, 19170, p. 95. a Linton, 1936a, p. 314. 
W H I T E ]  “DIFFUSION VS. EVOLUTION” 353 
trait-the horse, for example-enters the Plains area and is adopted it becomes 
a part of Plains culture. So far so good. “Seneca” and “Plains” are here used 
merely as convenient labels for groups of phenomena. But some anthropologists 
have not stopped here. They have conceptualized “Seneca” culture so as to 
represent it as if it were a self-contained cultural entity. They have said, for 
example, that  evolutionist theory requires that Seneca culture, or Plains  
culture, pass through a certain series of stages of development. And here they 
have run into error and confusion. 
Since Seneca culture can mean only that portion of human culture that is 
associated with the Seneca tribe, it  follows that Seneca culture can mean only 
the doings and experiences of the Seneca people. In short, to say that Seneca 
culture must pass through a certain series of stages is only a disguised way of 
saying that the Seneca people must pass through such and such stage. Or, in 
the case of the Plains, that such and such a region must pass through such a 
series. Now the evolutionists never said anything like this. They have said 
that culture, in general, or in certain of its aspects, such as writing, metallurgy, 
or social organization, must pass through certain stages. But they never main- 
tained that certain tribes or regions had to do so. 
Strictly speaking, there is no such cultural category as Seneca or Plains 
culture, any more than there is such a thing as English mathematics, Kansas 
horses, or Plains climate. To  be sure, if by Seneca culture you mean no more 
than “that portion of human culture that happens to  be associated with a 
tribe called Seneca,” no objection is to be raised against it. On the contrary, 
it is to be commended for its brevity and economy. Similarly, no one would 
object to “English mathematics,” “Kansas horses,” or “Plains climate,” if it 
were clear that  what was meant was “that portion of the mathematics de- 
veloped by the human race that is associated with a people called English,” 
“those members of Equus caballus that  are to be found within the boundaries 
of the state of Kansas,” and “the meteorological conditions found in the region 
known as the Plains,” respectively. But it is fairly obvious that English is not 
a category within the class mathematics; Kansas is not a category within the 
class horses; and Plains is not a meteorological category. There are Percheron 
and Arabian horses, draft and saddle horses, five-toed and hoofed horses, but 
no Kansas  horses that can be distinguished zoologically from Nebraska horses. 
There are arid, torrid, frigid, humid, temperate, climates, but no Plains clim- 
ate. 
But certain anthropologists have talked about Seneca culture and Plains 
culture as if they were cultural categories rather than ethnic and geographic 
referents. Consequently they have been led to apply the evolutionist’s cultural 
formulas to them, saying “Seneca culture must, according to the evolutionist’s 
formula, pass through such and such stages.” When, therefore, they find that 
the Senecas alter their culture by borrowing, and, as a people, skip certain 
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stages, they say that the evolutionist’s formula is invnlid:itetl. Evolutionist 
formulas are applicable to  such things ;is the long house, the conlederacy, or 
to other cultural features, but not to the peoples thcmsclves. 
Certainly one of the doniinant notes in ethnological theory during rcwnt  
decades has been that of anti-evolutionism. Just ;is the philosol)hy of cultural 
evolution dominated the era of Morgan, S1)encer rind ‘l’yl(ir, so has the rc- 
actionary p1iilosol)hy of anti-evolution prcvailcd to  a great extent in our own 
(lay. The  repudiation and reject ion of evolutionism has heen one of the 
principal theoretical contributions of the Boas School.a7 One ol the  must potent 
weapons in the anti-evolutionist’s arsenal has long been the  argument t h a t  clif- 
fusion negates evolution. This nrgument is, ;is we have tlcmonstratc(l, fal- 
lacious. ‘It rests upon an error of logic: the confusion of things that are tliffcrent 
and distinct-the evolution of culture and the culture history of pcoliles. With 
the exposure of this error the principal support of the anti-evolutionist position 
is rcmoved. 
The triumph of the “tliffusion negatcs evolution” argument ant1 its success 
for so many years presents an interesting prohlem for the student of thc be- 
havior of scientists and of the growth of scientific tradition. IIow could an error, 
which when exposcd seems almost absurdly obvious, have had such it run? 
Dispassionately one wonders how a man (Boas) who has been hailed as  “the 
foremost champion of scientific method i n  the  field” (I,owieGH), “the greatest of 
living anthropologists” (Benedi(.P),  could have committed such an error. One 
wonders, too, how it could have heen accel i ted and perpetuated by more than 
one generation of Boas’ students. I t  is intlectl a rernarl~itile I)henomenon, one 
that invites reflection upon the nature of tradition among scientists. 
We have shown in an earlier article70 how error, once established in an- 
thropology, may be perpetuated inclef-initely. We seem to have another example 
of this here. Graduate students have becn taught for years that  the iacts of clif-  
iusioii “lay the axe to the root of any theory of cultural evolution.” ‘I’hey grow 
87 .\nti-evolutioi~ism litis not. ol coiirsc, I)een continct! t o  I he I ~ S  groiil). ’I’hc Kulturkrvis- 
or as  its lerttler, l:athcr LVm. Schmidt Iircfers to  call i t ,  the  Cultural IIistoricaI--scIioi)I is i11so 
vigorously anti-evolutionist. Many if 110t niost of the  I)roniiiient mciiil 
1<oman Catholic priests, who, as Clyde Kluckhohn (1936, 1). 17.1) has lmiiiti~l OLII, “arc alniost 
compelled to reject ‘Ilvolutionismus’ ” I)ecat~se of their aclherencc to the tcncts of tficir church. 
The anti-evolutionisiii of the Kulturlircis group rests, thercfore, u1)on the firm fouiitlntion of 
Catholic dogma. T h e  source and basis or the anti-evoliitioiiist philosol)liy 01 thr  I k ~ s  group arc not 
nearly as obvious. The similarity of aiili-evolutionist spirit and outlook of t he  two schools is indi- 
catcd, howver ,  by the enthusiasm and satisfaction with which All~crt Muntsch, S.J., and I lenry S. 
Spulding (1928, I)I) .  3 ,  4,  8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 20, 23, 2.2, etc.) cite Professor I,owie lor his assaults 
upon evolution in general and L. 11. Morgan in  1):irticiiI:ir. 
Lowic, 192(3b, 1 1 .  186. 111 this review, Lo\\ ic 1)r;iiscs Cory for having fired hinlself from the 
“incubus of the unilineai evolution clogm;r.” 
09 Benedict, 1 9 4 0 , ~ .  vii. 7u M7hik, 1944. 
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up, write books, and teach new generations of students that  diffusion negates 
evolution. And so the error grows, gaining authority with added years. And, 
lest anyone think that this particular error has lost its vigor, tha t  it has grown 
feeble with the decline of BOBS’ dominance, or has disappeared with the death 
of the master, we call attention to a recent article in the AMERICAN ANTIIRO- 
PoLoGIsr. In an  essay entitled “On the Concept of Culture and some Cultural 
Fal la~ies ,”~’  David Bidney reports that:  
As Boas and other American aiithropologists have cstablishctl, thc  historical dif- 
fusion of customs and artifacts plus thc empirical evitlonce conccrning thc diversity of 
cultural sequences has reiitlcrecl t h c  cvolutionary theory of natural laws of cultural 
dcvclopment untcnablc (pp. 41--42). 
‘I’he error is still alive and appears to be flourishing. One can only wonder 
how much longer i t  will persist. 
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